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A b stract
Although large scale software reuse has been studied and practiced in industry
for more than 20 years, there are some practice areas where it has presented both
technical and business challenges. A sector notable for exhibiting these challenges is
defense electronics, the home business arena of the client organization. We have
gathered information from academic and broad industry work to compare with the
sponsor's experience over the past 15 years. Their organization has built a software
reuse program over this time, and benefits from significant exploration of component,
module, and software. product line' reuse models. In this context, we try to make sense
of and understand patterns of the sponsor's cases, also concentrating on the business
and technological environment and the resultant constraints that bound software
projects. Our general hypothesis is that success of a reuse program is affected by:
project organization type, the team's support and performance, and the design-for-reuse
quality of the product. The business success that flows from the reuse program is
dependent upon the strategic decisions made with reuse in mind as well as the
suitability of the program's structure to the overall business model.
In the sponsor's case, this suitability was less than perfect due to the nuances of the
defense industry. We draw valuable insights from these cases and present them in a
manner useful by similar projects. Further, experience with the product platform
technique presents cases that may reveal how it requires the rigor of strict product focus
to best serve the business. The main output of this work is to offer conclusions that can
be used to shape business area strategy and reuse techniques based on specific
conditions of the potential projects or product faniilies.
Thesis Supervisor: Alan MacCormack,
Visiting Associate Professor, Sloan School of Management
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The development of complex systems in the defense industry is challenging due to the
extremely difficult problems the systems must solve simultaneously maintaining
viability as a business. Electronics systems exhibit an increasing reliance on software
processing to perform the desired capabilities and flexibility. Engineering teams have
looked to improve their effectiveness at software development by seeking to reuse
earlier bodies of code that were useful. The business of software reuse requires that the
development group maintain commonality and product integrity in the customer funded
development environment. The sponsoring company would especially like to
understand how best to organize a software reuse and product platforming structure in
the general business model of their industry.
After spending 15 years working for the sponsor of this research, the author has
experienced a full lifecycle of product development, the progression from hardware to
software focused implementations, the beginnings of software reuse, and eventually a
software product family and a full generation of a product platform approach. The
client has seen moderate success starting with early reuse projects that came in over
budget and with reuse numbers in the disappointing 50% range. The next wave of
projects could not benefit from the lessons of the first group (as they had not completed
yet) and were happy to be underbidding competition by 57%. These same efforts would
see execution issues after contract award as the reuse library was immature. Eventually,
projects would learn to estimate, plan, and execute reuse projects, some seeing the team
beat their plan's cost projection by 20% (a cost performance index of 1.2) and reuse of
96%.
Below the highly successful surface of less challenging projects, many serious issues can
be found that threaten the viability of the program's future. First, projects with new and
challenging technical problems are seeing lower than expected reuse amounts - the
library isn't as suitable as it is for some 'more typical' projects. Second, the maintenance
and sustainment funding stream has run out in the defense market's downturn. This
challenges the business model of software reuse in this sector. We are motivated to
survey the academic and industrial environment for new and relevant techniques, and
also take a close look at our experience cases to find unique insights.
1.2 The research question
In general, this work will try to find what framework for software reuse can be
prescribed to the client organization. At the highest level of observation over many
software intensive projects, it seems that projects can be modeled as having inputs,
managerial decisions, execution factors, and resultant outcomes. We are familiar with
the array of inputs and constraints that influence the project. The more specific
questions below center on guidance that can be found for managerial decisions
pertaining to project execution, aiming to yield the most successful outcome possible.
1. What insight does the client's experience with software reuse projects reveal about
the impact of input conditions and management decisions on project success?
2. What is a prescriptive framework that will help steer future projects?
1.3 Method
This work begins with a study of prior literature on software reuse for methods and
lessons learned. The broader software development industry has applicable lessons to
from which we can learn. Of particular value, though, are those insights gained in more
closely relevant sectors. To that end, the consulted literature will at least include the
following terms: Defense, high performance systems, project organization, software
reuse architecture, component development, and development team productivity.
As background, the client's experience will be discussed to illustrate the bigger picture
and be at least aware of the system boundaries within which this topic resides. Attempts
will be made to extend our study of the problem into as broad a context as possible.
Case studies will be presented that highlight the key projects conducted in the client's
larger software reuse program.
Data from these projects was then analyzed to understand the project outcomes that
may be optimized by strategies and decisions made by management. We will see in
section 4.2 which issues tend to have influence on execution and outcome of a reuse
effort.
From this research, case study, and analysis, in section 5, we present a prescriptive
framework for guidance of future software projects. A graphical view of the problem
space is shown here in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Inputs and Constraints Drive Software Reuse Strategy and
Tactics to Enable Successful Execution
The real value of this work is to enable business and project leadership to develop the
strategy and roadmap in a more informed manner. The benefit of experience in the
software reuse organization is valuable, but it can get scattered and incomplete. This
work is an attempt to centralize the experience and insights in a useful and practical
way.
2 Literature Review
To begin this study of software reuse, we surveyed the existing literature for everything
from broad reuse theory to specific lessons learned from various industries. There were
a few works that stand out as solid surveys of software reuse as a general strategy for
good engineering practice. What follows is a synopsis of the relevant portions to this
research. First, Kreuger's work for Carnegie Mellon University (published in the ACM,
1992) simply titled Software Reuse provides us with a good outline for modern
techniques of software reuse.
Software reuse has been around since the earliest days of software development. The
first developer probably reused his main program constructs for the second program he
wrote, and the second developer probably reused some code from that first developer.
Kreuger reminds us that the idea of software engineering was first presented in 1968 as
a proposed solution to the Software Crisis. McIlroy's thesis at the time was "that the
software industry is weakly founded, and that one aspect of this weakness is the absence
of a software components sub-industry."2 The impetus for further work is that despite a
long history, the practice of reuse is still fraught with complications that inhibit
sustainable, effective reuse efforts. Kreuger presents four techniques for reuse:
abstraction, selection, specialization, and integration; and eight approaches, or
strategies. The closest match to the sponsor's experience is reuse by integration of
source code components3, where a set of modules communicate through an
interconnection framework. In this scenario, the components import and export data
and interface in a standard way. The intention is for the components to be the 'unit of
reuse'. There are many nuances of this strategy when it is applied to object oriented
(00) programming.
It is worth noting that the sponsor chose an object oriented approach for its software
reuse program. There were many reasons for this, not the least of which was that the
00 method of software development was at a high point in popularity and buzz around
2McIlroy, M. D. (1968). Mass Produced Software Components, Software Engineering Conferencefor the
NATO Science Committee, 1968.
3 Kreuger, C. W. (1992). Software Reuse, ACM Computing Surveys, Vol 24, No 2. - pg 133
the time of the launch of the reuse program. Many of the principals in the program's
design and initial implementation firmly believed in the benefits brought by inheritance,
classes, and subclasses. Early versions of the reuse library demonstrated sound
execution of these techniques, and boded well for efficient adoption and success of the
reuse program. Issues arose as the software library grew with the number of developers.
"Overall, the 00 benefits were not realized.4" Newer developers were not quite as
effective at implementing sound 00
practice for reuse in the library. The current he fo te uisms T ere imle tare
state of the library exhibits challenges as it ments on reuse that have been difficult
to satisfy in practice.
conflicts with two of Kreuger's truisms (see Fur a software reuse techNque to be effective, it
inset). The more advanced use of object must ree the cogni distce between theinset). inmtal concept of a system and its final executable
orientation prevented newer developers implementation.
For a software reuse technique to be effectve, it
from being able to easily 'know what it does' must be easis( to reuse the artifacts than it is to
Thevelop the software from scratch.
and 'find it faster'. To select an att for reuse, you Must know what
it does.
To reuse a software artifact effectivey, you must be
able at "fi it" faster than you could "build t
Figure 2: Kreuger's Truisms about Software Reuse What are the oen areas of research in software
reuse? There is clearly Much Work that remins to
Kreuger also observes that for software be doe In generl, the search for high-level ah
stractions few software artifacts is probaly the mtal
reuse in large, complex systems to be crucial, bu thes type of research is not new o
unoqe t software reuse.cnqet e fetvi
effective, abstraction plays a vital role. uqet otaerue
"Developers must either be familiar with the abstractions a priori or must take time to
study and understand the abstractions"5. As the client's software reuse library became
large and its use spread more widely throughout the organization, more and more
developers were employed to execute projects. The core team of developers that created
the library was unable to train all the new developers in their standard ways of object
oriented programming and the use of the library.
If Kreuger bestows upon us a framework for considering reuse as an objective, later
work by Frakes and Terry 6 presents a consolidated summary of models of reuse (ACM,
41Interview Quote, subject #3
5Kreuger, '92, Pg 1786 Frakes, W. & Terry, C. (1996). Software Reuse: Metrics and Models, ACM computing surveys, Vol 28, no
2
metrics and models '96) that can be used to determine if the cost of a reuse program is
justified by the benefits. This is the next step in the process of determining a software
enterprise's reuse strategy. At a summary level, Frakes admits that "none of these
models are derived from data, nor have they been validated," though they provide a
metric for comparison of potential options. Once a model has been created for multiple
options and scenarios, one can use it to explore the limits of a software reuse program's
viability.
There are two cost benefit models presented by Gaffney and Durek (1989) that are
discussed by Frakes and Terry. They both aim to quantify "the cost of software
development for a given product relative to all new code". This means that the result is
a factor, "C", representing how much less developing a product with reused code will
cost in the long term. A manager can run a few calculations and compare alternatives in
the relative cost space. The fact that the models are meant for comparison purposes
only, since they are not validated or empirical, limits their value if the user has only a
small number of alternatives to explore and little experience with the model. While both
models are insightful, the second model incorporates an amortization for the cost of
reusability over a number of follow-on projects. This brings in the 'benefit' side of the
equation and gives more weight to a project that will be reused more times.
Frakes and Terry's work is a helpful compilation of metrics and models that will enable a
team to put most of the relevant issues on the program design table. These issues can be
discussed in a objective, metrics based format, which will help identify the best strategy
for the reuse program. An example of one model calculation is shown in section 4.4.
Jacobson et al. provide a more broad discussion of the overall reuse concept and how it
enables a viable business in "Making the Reuse Business Work"7. The most relevant
points are:
A strong architecture is required for a successful reuse program. The structure
and interfaces of the software project must be designed so that they will support
7 Jacobson, I., Griss, M., & Jonsson, P. (1997) Making the Reuse Business Work. Software Reuse:
Architecture, Process and Organizationfor Business Success, ACM press, chapter 15 -
reuse while effectively meeting the needs of the system. This means that the
software must be extensible enough for long term reuse and modular enough for
use by many developers for a portfolio of applications. Jacobson reminds us that
an architecture and design that are understandable by the team is important as
they go forth and execute projects.
" Instituting a reuse program takes change, which is painful for some individuals.
Success of the reuse program requires a strong vision, to make the change work.
This is enabled by (and actually requires) an executive commitment. Investment
must be made, and the payback period may be lengthy, so high level support is a
must.
e The business aspects of a software reuse program are vital. An organization
should expect that it will take some time to recover the investment in the reuse
program. It is also important that the business model accept the reuse process.
"50-70% of business engineering attempts fail, largely due to insufficient
attention to the 'soft' factors ... to address these risks with a systematic transition
process that emphasizes vision, organization building, focused on competence
units, and suitable models offinancing."8
A fundamental work on reuse programs was done by Poulin and Hancock at IBM in the
early 1990's. Their paper is a comprehensive look at software reuse it's early days of
popularity. It is recommended reading for a larger enterprise seeking to start a reuse
program. The lessons learned at IBM coupled with the researcher's combination of
technical and business insights lend value to the would-be reuse effort.
Of the main concepts presented as fundamental to reuse, an interesting one is that
"software development with reuse" is an entity unto itself. Two approaches are
proposed here, composition and generative. In the composition approach, the one
employed by the sponsor organization, applications are built out of reusable building
blocks. "The building block approach requires components with encapsulated function,
well-defined and specified interfaces, and known quality."9 These building blocks of
8JaggbSOn et al (1997)
9 Poulin, J. S., Caruso, J. M., & Hancock, D. R. (1993). The business case for software reuse, IBM Systems
Journal, 32,, pg. 567
actual code enable a developer to reuse components in a very modular way, and add to
them by following the standard interfaces.
Another business unit within the sponsor company uses a generative approach, in which
engineers model the software and use "automated tools or generator programs" to
produce compile-able code from a model and existing designs. This method is better
suited for development teams that are fully trained to model their software, and wish to
control the model as well as the code. Both approaches have utility and merit, it just
depends on where a team wants to focus its effort - on designs and models, or on code
modules. Another relevant point that Poulin makes is in identifying the difference
between information (and software) producers and consumers. We will see this is a
relevant issue later in our discussion of software reuse by cloning, and then the
difficulties of maintaining a single software baseline in a product platform.
Poulin and Hancock break a potential reuse effort down to its cost benefit tradeoffs.
They outline some of the models previously discussed (Gaffney and Durek, '89) with an
expanded set metrics used by IBM to reflect the effort saved in the reuse program.
These metrics are similar to those used by the sponsor's organization to measure their
effectiveness as a reuse team. In section 4, we will compile some of these same metrics
for the sponsor organization to use in our analysis.
Finally, Poulin and Hancock perform a Net Present Value (NPV) analysis for the Return
on Investment (ROI) of a reuse program. In this analysis, they look at Reuse Cost
Avoidance (RCA) and Additional Direct Costs (ADC) for the program, both important
factors to consider. Figure 5, on pg 591 provides an excellent example of the ROI
analysis at the corporate level for a reuse program. The results of this NPV analysis are
plotted in Figure 3, below.
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Figure 3: Cost Recovery for a Reuse Case at IBM
The example ROI presented is 104% over the 5 year period. This is "extraordinarily
high", but the authors admit that it does not include the inherent risks in many of their
underlying assumptions. This is a very insightful point to remember when considering a
reuse program. We can make many assumptions on the business case, costs, adoption,
reuse percentages, and the like; but they are all predictions and assumptions, each with
a high risk of being completely separate from reality. As managers, we must explore the
variance of these assumptions and try the cost-benefit analysis out with combinations of
less positive situations to see if we are still comfortable with the endeavor.
Fichman and Kemerer 's work from the Journal of Systems and Software, 2001,
acknowledges the glut of reuse techniques, literature, and frameworks. Their main
insight is that "in spite of this, systematic reuse has been difficult to achieve in
practice."10 This is because programs fail to explore one of the top inhibitors in the
success of software reuse programs, the lack of alignment in the motivation of project
management with that of the reuse program. The project's cost and schedule
constraints do not allow the reuse team to expend the effort to make the software as
reusable as they could or should. This is called a lack of "incentive compatibility" -
1 Fichman, R. G., Kemerer, C. F. (2001). Incentive compatibility and systematic software reuse. The
Journal of Systems and Software, 57,45-60.
trying to deliver a product at a competitive cost and schedule is in conflict with the reuse
program's objectives of implementing the ideal reuse software components.
Ted Davis, of the Software Productivity Consortium, made an early attempt to create a
framework to help evolve a reuse program in 1993. His Reuse Capability Model helps
asses an organization's reuse capability and looks at goals and critical success factors for
a potential endeavor.
As we will see in the next section, the software reuse program of interest evolved from a
component based software reuse effort into a product platform approach. This
literature review would be incomplete without acknowledgement of the original product
platform work set forth by Meyer and Lehnerd in the late '90s. Their definition: "A
product platform is a set of subsystems and interfaces that form a common structure
from which a stream of derivative products can be efficiently developed and produced.""
This definition and philosophy guided the development of the sponsor's product
platform. There is a significant body of research in the product platform area, from the
original book, "The Power of Product Platforms", to any number of interpretive and
practical guides. Meyer and Seliger's article applying the topic to software development
is a helpful and illustrative guide. Their hypotheses are often upheld, though they
advertise success through the product platform technique prior to later longitudinal
studies had been conducted that illustrated some sharp potential causes of failure.
Morisio et al. (2002) performed one such study that investigated patterns of success and
failure in 25 software reuse projects. Their findings were insightful - highlighting the
necessity of executive commitment. Other necessary factors were: introduction of reuse
processes, modification of non-reuse processes for reuse, and consideration of human
factors12. It also cites a misconception that object oriented development and the
existence of a reuse repository alone will enable a successful reuse program.
11 Meyer, M. H., Lehnerd, A.P. (1997). The Power of Product Platforms. as quoted in: Meyer and Seliger, R.
(1998). Sloan Management Review, Fall'98, 61-74.
12Morisio, M., Ezran, M., Tully, C. (2002). Success and Failure Factors in Software Reuse, IEEE
transactions on software engineering vol 28, no 4.
We conclude our literature review with a state of the industry's research by Frakes and
Kang. A handful of recent "product line engineering" projects are summarized, with
comparative comments for each. The most relevant portion to this study is the
identification of sustainability as a challenge. "A current problem is to find the means of
sustaining reuse programs on a long term basis"13. They highlight the important choice
of which parts of a system are reusable and how to do technology transfer. We will see
these issues play into the sponsor's software reuse efforts as well.
Much has been studied and written about software reuse that is relevant to our
organization's situation and research thereof. The available information on strategies,
vital elements of a reuse program, cost-benefit models, and post-mortem studies
provides us with enough guidance to create or run a reuse program with some
effectiveness. The application of that guidance to our chosen reuse organization is the
subject of this research. It is notable that most of the referenced work has been done for
the commercial industry, which begs the question, "how is it different in the defense
industry?" We will show that the difference in business models creates a gap in the
ability to simply transfer all of the available guidance. Our challenge is to narrow that
gap and critique the reuse program of interest and provide guidance going forward.
13 Frakes, W., Kang, K. (2005). Software Reuse Research, Status and Future. IEEE transactions on
Software engineering vol 31, no 7,529-536.
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3 Sponsor experience with software reuse
3.1 Definitions and Background
The previous sections of this work dealt with motivation for software reuse (in a
challenging business and technical environment) and past literature that was relevant to
the same topic. Throughout those sections, we have used the terms project, program,
and product heavily. Before we cover details of these with respect to the client's
business, let us provide definitions for these entities.
Project: An individual software development effort. These efforts have their own
requirements, budget, and schedule constraints, but can be part of a family of projects
all for a similar customer.
Reuse Program: A concerted effort to reuse software throughout an organization on
multiple projects. Good (but not all) reuse programs are choreographed from the
individual developers through management to executive sponsorship. They also include
the development and business processes of the organization. They aim to be systematic,
effective, and cost saving.
Product: A system that the organization develops and/or sells. For this study, the
system has significant software content.
Product Line: A lineage of related products. Newer ones are based on their
predecessors, and they all have some common functionality. The Software Engineering
Institute at Carnegie Mellon defines: "A software product line (SPL) is a set of
software-intensive systems that share a common, managed set offeatures satisfying
the specific needs of a particular market segment or mission and that are developed
from a common set of core assets in a prescribed way."
We will discuss software reuse as it applies to the defense electronics sector. This
discussion includes the defense acquisition process, of which there are many phases.
The official depiction of this process is shown below in Figure 4.
14 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/productlines/index.cfm
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Figure 4: The DoD acquisition process and lifecycle15
From the contractor's perspective, there is also a parallel process that overlaps with
"User Needs" and "Pre-Systems Acquisition" where new business ideas are cultivated
and a candidate solution is developed. Some definitions of these steps are below:
New Business Capture: A broad term referring to the process of developing new
business, such as competing in proposals, up to and including the signing of a contract.
Technical Baseline: The technical "approach" taken (or planned) by the development
team to create a system. This includes the system hardware, and software designs,
however rough they may be early on in a project.
System Architecture: Though there are many definitions, one is: "The embodiment of
concept, and the allocation ofphysical/informationalfunction to elements ofform, and
definition of interfaces among the elements and with the surrounding context." 16 In a
product line or product platform, many systems will use a'common' architecture.
Implementation (Code, Unit Test): The phase of development where real code is written.
It begins after the architecture and design are set, and ends with a unit test of the
software.
15https://acc.dau.mil/CommunitvBrowser.aspx?id=3237&apng=en-US
16 Prof. E. Crawley, MIT ESD.34 Lecture Notes, Lecture 1, Fall 2009.
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Integration and Test: The phase of development where individual functional pieces
(subsystem 1, 2, hardware, software) are brought together and made to work as a
system. It also includes verifying that the integrated system meets its requirements.
In Figure 4, we don't see the detail on most of these phases other than new business
capture. The others occur in varying rigor and duration during each of the phases after
milestone A.
3.2 A brief history of the subject Software product family
Systems of electronics have been procured and used by the US military since WWI. The
cold war saw a major uptick in development of electronics systems as techniques used
by our adversaries became too complex to defeat 'by hand'. These systems were
primarily hardware based until general computing and software development became a
mainstream approach in the 1980's. Technology then evolved to host software on
military grade hardware and/or ruggedized commercial computing hardware for
military use. The reconfigurability and lower size, weight, and power of software
systems made them a more attractive basis around which to form a solution, and they
gained in prominence. By the mid 1990s, one could expect to visit certain portions of
Navy Ships and Air Force platforms and see racks and racks of electronics all running
software to enable the warfighter to do his/her job.
This study's client participated in that rise of electronics and software systems. The mid
1990s saw major projects executed through development to production and deployment
of systems into the user's hands. At the same time, the evolution to object oriented
programming and the rise in popularity of reconfigurable software architectures
brought many competitors to offer a flexible, expandable (or so they advertized)
software solution to new materiel procurement requirements. The industry-wide
realization was that "now (circa'99) we can [build a system] in software where we
couldn't before."17 The client researched these ideas, but took no substantive action.
The combination of these factors caused more than one large competitive acquisition to
be awarded to another contractor over the client, despite the client's incumbent status in
17 Interview quote, subject #1
that space. This caused a major wake-up call and a serious re-grouping throughout the
client's leadership and technical ranks. A reconfigurable, reusable software product of
their own was adopted as the solution, and so began the long process of implementing
this solution.
"Large Scale software reuse was the whole idea," commented the software family's
technical director, who is commonly referred to as the 'father' of the program. In this
case, the technical director was in the perfect position to lay out the main idea; his
responsibilities were for both technology strategy and direction, while driven primarily
by the new business development effort. What the leadership was hearing from their
customers at the time was that they "needed a modular architecture in software (similar
to modularity in hardware) to enable hardware independence and scalability. The 3-4
tiered model that the architecture team developed would require a fast communications
fabric, but also one that was very robust. The team would spend days and weeks trying
to "stump" themselves as to how a type of system could not be built from their
architecture.
Once the architecture was set, a crucial step according to Jacobson ('97), a team of the
organization's finest software developers and algorithmists embarked on building the
core reuse modules. They would become a software product family, that we will call
Odin. It required a "really strong vision to ride herd" on the creative development team,
who were just as likely to stray from the vision as any team when faced with a
challenging task for an extended period of time. At the outset, the main group of
developers "didn't know well how to design for reuse", but the program's leadership was
simultaneously out reading everything they could find on the subject and bringing their
learnings back to the team. These sources included the relatively new Rational Unified
Process (RUP) and its associated reuse efforts18. RUP would serve as the model most
closely followed by Odin's implementation team. One might observe that a reuse library
creation team that included algorithmists might not be ideal - the core software should
be developed with only reuse in mind. The rationale for including them on the team was
that in this competitive environment, if the initial development effort did not emerge
18 Jacobson et al. (1997).
with a demonstrable system that performed core domain functions, the investment
would be a failure. The leadership team felt they had to parlay the resulting prototypes
into a contract effort as soon as possible, and customer relevance would be therefore
required at the outset.
Throughout this process, the motivation was clear:
" The business needed a solution to rival competitor's software solutions that were
being chosen by the finite customer set.
" Everyone believed in one of the tenants of software reuse, "why should doing
essentially the same thing" ever need to be redone, especially if it had been done
well once already?
* If a solid reuse library existed, time would be saved by not re-coding existing
software and funding would be available to work on the technology
improvements and system quality that the customers and taxpayers paid for and
expected out of the client's teams.
" As software became the backbone of all the electronics systems developed, the
size of the software effort became the metric upon which all other functions based
their scope of work. If the software effort could be reduced, it had a
multiplicative effect on the effort and costs saved throughout the project.
By 2000, the software product family was ready for its first demonstration projects. The
model for reuse was examined and the organization chose a version of the component
approach (according to Poulin et al pg 569), that of course fit their component-
framework architecture. In the first iterations, the reuse library required executive
support to convince a new start project to adopt it as their baseline. The project groups
(usually related by customer) were tightly knit and found it difficult to accept that their
new project would be created by a nucleus of software developed by 'some other group'
on internal research funding. In order to let these projects maintain their identity and
cohesiveness, and for the reuse program team to continue development of the library,
the organization created 'client projects'. These projects would be located in their
existing physical space and staffed mostly by engineers already on related or legacy
projects. They would take a release from the reuse program and use the base
components and communications framework to create their system. The reuse program
staff would be 'on call' to support issues as they arose. This became known as the 'client
project' model, and was not without its share of issues as development got underway.
We will discuss these issues in the case subsection, to follow.
As the reuse program continued, with the mixed success of the first client projects and
the resultant growth of the "client support" role for the reuse team, the enterprise
realized that if that support role was to continually increase, the apparent next step was
a full-fledged support organization that was all but required to enable success by the
client projects. The difficulties the projects had with immaturity of the library and
applying it to their system demonstrated that the software wasn't "really all that
portable."19 There was also certainly some growing pain and apprehension at the
individual developer level as they became concerned that projects didn't really have a
choice to develop software the way they wanted. That all just contributed to difficulty of
adopting the reuse software (and its component-framework implementation) as the
baseline approach for future development, despite the goodness of the architecture.
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19 Interview quote, subject #2
3.3 Product platform experience
To address the lack of portability, the thought proposed was "let's build [a more
integrated] hardware/software"2o product as the reusable unit. This idea was
intentionally aligned with the Product Platform methodology, proposed by Meyer and
Lehnerd21 and enjoying popularity at that time (2002). Though the core definition of a
product platform is a "set of subsystems and interfaces", the general aim by the reuse
program in the next phase after their first 2-3 clients was to provide a collection of
software (possibly a subsystem) that would be most easily adopted by a client project. It
was also noted that although first client projects saw a significant reduction in code
development effort (a major success for the reuse program), the integration and test
phases of the projects were still costly.
Figure 5: Code development reduced, but Integration and Test Remained Steady
The organization's technical leadership was proud of the reduction in code hours, but
felt that the overall savings was not enough to prove that the investment in the reuse
program was making the business immediately more cost competitive. At this point, the
20 Interview quote, subject #2
21 Mark Meyer book and article on SW PPs
product platform idea seemed to be a logical next step. Another contributing factor was
that 2-3 upcoming new business opportunities had significant alignment in functional
requirements. The group conceived of a possibility to "design the waterfront of what all
customers would want."22 Most of that design would be the product platform.
This approach would also serve the purpose of getting projects up and running faster.
The nucleus of the product platform from the software perspective (there was also a
hardware component) was a combination of the framework and components from the
library into a few common 'threads' of processing that were reusable as a group. These
threads would perform major functions and could be further combined to tailor the
product for the nuances of the individual project. In this way, the product platform was
in tight alignment with their inspiring vision, summarized below from (Meyer '98):
"For a software company, the benefits of a robust platform include the ability to
more rapidly and flexibly create products tailored for particular niches within
the company's market focus. This is achieved by building small, solution specific
modules that plug into a larger, more generalized foundation of common
program code that provides base-line functionality for all specific solutions. This
approach can lead to market advantage through more timely new product
introduction and a richer product family..."
Creating a product platform required still further investment. Fortunately, two or three
years had passed since the initial investment of IRaD (Internal Research and
Development) funding and the company was willing to swallow the next pill of
investment in a more vertically integrated product. The product platform would build
on the increasingly mature reuse library of its first investments and become a system
unto itself. By system, we mean an interconnected set of components, running on its
own hardware, that accepts inputs and performs a function of value as an output. In
keeping with the product platform model, the system, or "common product" as it
became known, would have some common components and threads that were used in
most versions of the derivative products. It would also have customizable or extendable
portions that enabled the common product to meet specific and larger sets of
requirements than those met by the common portions alone.
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22 Interview quote, Subject #2.
We will now examine some of the pertinent aspects of creating and executing a product
platform.
3.3.1 Project Team Organization
The organization of the reuse program and product platform team evolved to support
the changing needs imposed by the business area. In addition to the 'client project'
model discussed above, they created a project approach called a "model" where portions
of the project that overlapped with common product scope would be performed directly
in the reuse organization. Models were supposed to enable the newly developed
software to be as 'common' and ready for reuse as possible. We will also refer to this
type of team as the 'common product' team.
Though models showed some success (as measured by downstream reuse of their
product), the multiple constraints within the business area caused the creation of
another project type that we will call a "hybrid". A hybrid project used a mix of
developers from the common product organization and those from the client project
areas. Hybrid projects were located in a physical space away from the common product
group. The driving constraints for these types of projects were: security (customer
classification dictated the project be behind closed doors), a strong customer team
identity, and freedom to develop a system that was not intended to be common.
The type of team organization chosen by the business area for each new project is one of
the important decisions that have significant influence on the execution of the project.
A model type project will yield a body of software that is more easily reused, but the
team will be pushed and pulled in many different directions. Due to their charter (of
developing reusable code), their requirements set will explicitly come from any project
that is expected to use their software later. They also do their development in more of a
'fish bowl' where managers and senior developers that might be using their output in the
coming months will spend effort (and distract the team) trying to impart their influence.
They hybrid team has fewer of these distractions, especially if they are separated from
some outside influences by their location in a classified area. They have the benefit of
experience as part of the core reuse team (at least part of the team comes from the
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common products group), and try to apply that to the project at hand. The downside is
that they are located with, and concentrate on, a project that usually has a tight deadline
and a narrow set of requirements. Overall, the sponsor's experience with reuse and
product platforms included examples of all three project organization types with varying
degrees of success. Some lessons can be learned, but the choice of project type is just
one of the pertinent factors to be considered when designing a project.
3.3.2 Challenges:
Requirements: As mentioned earlier, at the time of the product platform's creation, the
organization saw critical mass of new business opportunities gathering. The
intersection of the requirements from each of the new pursuits was easily identified as
being part of the common product's requirements. The reuse group quickly realized
that between the three potential projects, there was some variation in the completeness
and imperativeness of their requirements sets. The project with the most concrete
specification had more influence over the requirements to be levied on the common
product. Similar situations would arise at many other times as the common product
would always be an object of influence. Development teams saw value in being most
closely aligned with the product platform as it offered more chance for internal
investment funds, and more opportunity for visibility and possibly growth with
customers.
Funding: A major challenge facing the software reuse program and the product
platform (by extension) was its funding model and sources. Despite the common
knowledge and agreement that the reuse program would require internal funding to
create the software library, and later the common product, there was disagreement as to
what the ongoing business model would look like. These relative quantities can be seen
below in Figure 6. Two aspects of the business model were clear:
* Creation of the repository and initial product platform implementation would be
internally funded.
" Customer contracts would be secured for projects taking advantage of the
common products. These contracts were expected to be of significant value to
justify the internal investment.
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Figure 6: Reuse project funding
These concepts are consistent with many views of software reuse including Jacobson et
al '97 and Poulin et al '93. The challenge
came when the library and product had
been established and new contracts were
R ao enjoying the benefits while moving the
feature list forward. But who paid for
maintenance?
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Figure 7: Return on Investment takes time
Three sources of funding were at play in this situation: investment (R&D), contract, and
operational. The investment was made, the contracts were kicking in, but the plan for
the operational funding was thin. Four possibilities were debated:
Option i: Pull operational funding from other portions of the business.
23 Jacobson'97
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Option 2: Charge license fees on contracts (at a level sufficient) to support
maintenance
Option 3: Pull funds out of each contract to explicitly cover maintenance.
Option 4: Divert some operational funds from the business unit.
Option 2 was selected for its straightforward nature and avoidance of a long hard road
of debate over 'rice bowls' that might come with options 1 and 4. Unfortunately, this
decision was not without complicating facts. The launch of the product platform
coincided with arguably the height of the competitive environment in the last 20 years.
The client had only won three projects since the initial investment in the reuse program,
and one of the pursuits that helped shape the common product required an extremely
competitive proposal. This caused the end result to be a license levied on the potential
customer for that contract, but at a price of $o. This set the precedent of maintenance
being essentially unfunded from the outset. Additional R&D funds were arranged for
the first couple years, but this maintenance task did not meet the client's definition of
R&D, so it was not to last. Without giving away the punch line, it should be disclosed
that the reuse program as of this writing is on shaky ground. The lack of maintenance
and tech refresh funding is not without blame for this fact.
In contrast, a distant portion of the same large defense contracting enterprise has
developed a reuse program with better execution of a very similar business model. In
their case, 'Option 2' was also chosen, with small license fees at first. This enabled
customers to adopt the reuse library and enjoy cost reductions with success. As the
amount of projects reached critical mass, the license fees were raised to meet the
maintenance need. The level of impact on the project is only enough to cover the cost of
maintenance, and so it is accepted by customers.
Customization: The next challenge facing the reuse program was the amount of
customization to allow for each project. The client knew of some data points in the
customization debate:
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* ESU Technologies: This tier 3 supplier of RF and digital receivers had latched on
to the right niche some years earlier and had such a large customer and deployed
product base that it could afford to turn down requirements to customize its
product. Any customization desired would be paid for directly by a contract, and
that solution would not necessarily be supported in the future unless sufficient
quantities were ordered. This stance by ESU was a luxury unique in the industry.
" Black and Decker and The Honda Element: These product platform trade studies
demonstrated textbook application of common platforms with customization for
individual applications. The major distinction was the commercial market they
served. B&D and Honda had the latitude to design the product and implement
the customizations as they wished, simply taking the risk that sales would come
from a well executed product.
" Typical defense contracted electronics system: A defense acquisition customer
assembles a contract oversight team. The team of program managers, technical
'experts', and logisticians have the most contact with the contractor. They
develop or approve the requirements specifications, design, and many aspects of
implementation. The contractor does not have the latitude to develop the
product with little customization or it will not meet the customer's unique
requirements. The customer can demand customization because "he's paying the
bill".
Although the sponsor reuse organization strived for example #2 (B&D/Honda), they
were pushed by project contracting oversight staff into the typical customized solution
described in example #3.
Determining the extent of the common product: Product platform theory distinguishes
between the actual 'product platform' and 'derivative products'. The product platform is
what's common to all applications, while the derivative product can be derived from the
common portions or extended/customized. Originally, the sponsor's reuse organization
limited the scope of their product platform to:
* Some hardware (that which is not platform or customer-specific)
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" The basic reuse library made up of threads in the component-framework
architecture.
* Some software services like startup, shutdown, and tasking
This scope helped to contain the cost of the first iteration of the product platform. A
DSM (Design Structure Matrix) showing this structure is below in Figure 8. In a DSM,
long stripes of vertical entries are consistent with a module, or module(s), that interacts
with many other modules, like a communications bus. The vertical grouping along the
left is definitely a bus, and by examining the file list that created this DSM, we know it is
the framework. This portion of the system performs all of the command, control, and
communications, and was part of the common product platform. The services portion is
also a module that interacts with many others. The interesting observation is that the
other busses in this architecture were not part of the original product platform.
ACMFdDependencies
Size = 2988 Density = 027215 % Propagation Cost = 5.3377 %
Figure 8: DSM showing only some vertical 'busses' were common
Following the Mirror Hypothesis24, the product platform organization also did not
originally include project staff responsible for those other busses not included in the
common product. This would prove a difficult test of the architecture, the organization,
and the implementation of the product platform idea. The first couple projects executed
development through the basic threads relatively smoothly. Progress metrics showed
development on track and early indicators supported the reuse program as a success.
The next steps after completion of the common threads were for the client projects to
develop some of the higher level portions of the software system. Those were to include
the busses not covered by the reuse program; indicated by the vertical bars in the right
hand side of Figure 8. The client projects had some difficulty with these layers of
24 MacCormack, A. Rusnak, J, Baldwin, C. (2008). Exploring the Duality between Product and
Organizational Architectures: A Test of the Mirroring Hypothesis. Working Papers, v.5.
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processing and logic, namely higher level tasking and the graphical user interfaces. The
Odin team had excluded these parts of the system on the basis that they were too close
to the user's preferences and specific operating concept for each client program. The
reuse program was supposed to focus on the common threads of a typical subsystem,
and not customize too much.
Despite some difficulty in communicating interfaces from the core reuse group to the
client projects, the projects completed their work on the tasking and GUI software and
declared success. A pivotal moment came when the next similar set of client projects
came along and tried to reuse these two higher level layers of software. The new reusers
found that the higher layers had to match their use cases to be reused directly, but the
match was less than perfect, so major modifications must be made. In this situation, the
two project groups are in opposition about which implementation should be part of the
common product. A decision can be made for one or the other, or to support both, but
in any case, it can be a painful problem to solve and leaves the product less robust due to
divergent baselines.
Consuming and returning: If we mark the start of the software reuse process when a
developer grabs a chunk of code and reuses it, then we mark the transition to
'challenging' when that developer tries to return or merge his modified code back to
repository from whence it came. The real issue becomes how to support the first stage
of 'clone and own' and then later the need to return improvements, bug fixes, and
enhancements to a 'common baseline'. The product line approach sells itself based on
the ability to take updates that one project makes and 'seamlessly' apply them to other
projects in the product line. The need exists to enable simultaneous development of the
same software, branching, and uncommonality. These issues seem minor when we talk
about one source code file, but they become almost intractable when the baseline to be
merged is thousands of files. Starting reuse and branching is easy, trying to merge and
keep all the reuse clients satisfied is hard.
3.3.3 Product Platform Architecture
The software architecture defines the structure, components, and interfaces of the
system. From Jacobson et al '97:
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"Getting the architecture right provides many advantages. It ensures that many
organization units, scattered in space and time, can work on different components and
rest assured that they will come together successfully. It ensures that a system put
together in this manner will have integrity and a robust structure. It enables
maintainers later to modify local parts of it without disrupting other parts. This ability
to modify the system successfully enables it to evolve, as its environment changes. In
turn, successful evolution extends the life of the system.25"
The sponsor's component framework architecture was one of the overall strongest
successes of the reuse program, and certainly contributed to its longevity. It helped
achieve almost all of the advantages cited above. The DSM shown earlier indicates the
modularity of the architecture. The anecdotal input on how hard the development team
worked to stump themselves during development supports the fact that it was a well
designed, extensible architecture.
3.4 Case studies
A selection of brief case studies will be presented below to highlight the sponsor's varied
experience with reuse and product platforms. A pictorial timeline of the projects is
shown below in Figure 9.
Software Reuse Project "RS":investment Second Project "TS":
begins with let Beginning of "TR"j
IR&Dfunding ljet Product line
1999 2000 2002 4 2008 2010
Project "TF": Project "Al"
First Client First specialization
Projectfor of common Project "A2" Project 'CE"
Reuse Librar roduct I
Figure 9: software reuse and product platform timeline
Case #1: Project RS - This project was the second client reuse effort after the initial
launch of the program. It was conceived as a subsystem upgrade to an existing system
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that the sponsor had delivered years earlier and was fielded throughout the US Navy.
The upgrade consisted mostly of processing hardware and software, and it was very
similar to the original model of systems that the reuse program team had in mind when
they created the component framework architecture. These two facts made it a good
candidate for an early adoption project. The development sharing model for this project
was that of a strict 'client project'.
In this model, the reuse library was delivered in releases to the project. The team was
located in a different location than the core reuse developers. The project team was
expected to perform almost all of the development by themselves using release
documentation and only consulting with the engineers that created the reuse library. If
problems were discovered by the project team that required a change to the core library,
those problems were supposed to be fixed by the core team. This created some tension
between the two groups when the project team felt they could not move forward until a
problem with the core library was addressed. Tension was compounded by the fact that
the reuse library was still immature at this point, having only a few demonstrations and
two projects exercise the code before project RS had to 'make it work' for a real
customer with budget and schedule constraints. The customer was, of course, sold on
the merits of the reuse library as part of their decision to award the program to the
client.
This project was considered successful by some participants and observers because the
technical objectives were achieved, but this came at a cost of 17% over budget and 3-4
months of schedule delay.
Case #2: Project TS - This project is included in this study primarily because it served
as the launch of the product platform. It was a moderate sized System Development and
Demonstration (SDD) project. This type of project is expected to be the transition from
early phase, technology driven endeavors (that may not meet all the requirements) to a
mature system with proven readiness to be used by DoD warfighters.
Project TS just happened to be executed around the time of the reuse program's
transition from a simple software reuse organization to a product platform group. Some
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would say that the TS project was also a must-win for the business area, and it was
proposed against a very competitive landscape. It could be further speculated that the
only way the team could propose a price that was competitive enough to win would have
been with an existing product baseline that the business invested heavily in. Because of
this, the TS project's influence on the transition to a product platform, and the
implementation of that product platform, was strong.
The challenges seen by this project included two from the list in section 3.3.2. First, the
requirements set for this project was large enough that the collection was seen as a
'superset' of the requirements one might expect for multiple smaller typical systems.
This drove the architecture team to generate a system specification for the product
platform and for the project that was lengthy and detailed. It described a system that, if
implemented, could meet the business area's needs for reuse and follow-on projects for
many years to come. Although this was a feat of systems engineering, it challenged the
project and the reuse program to determine what to implement on the current funding
line and what to defer as nice-to-have, but unnecessary growth items.
The second challenge that took major influence on this project was the fit of the
fledgling product platform to the business' cost model in a way that would generate a
sufficient funding source to enable development. Although significant IRaD investment
had already been devoted to the reuse program, still more was needed to create the
product platform. After this hurdle was cleared, the real issue became finding funding
for important changes to the baseline that were not directly tied to project requirements.
In this case, a common product program should have been able to fund these common
maintenance type issues. The project was proposed with the license fee option, but by
the time it was on contract, the fee had been reduced to $o.
Case #3: Project Al - This project demonstrated how the issue of customization was a
needed part of the strategy for a product platform. The amount of customization each
project required would need to be considered for its impact on the product platform. At
this point, we should discuss a term that we defined, but haven't used yet - product line.
The best case is if a new project enhances functionality of an older product, and this
situation is even better if the new product is planned to be the next in the product line.
The architecture of the product line should support the expansion of capabilities, and
the iterations that implement them. "Getting the architecture right successfully enables
[the system] to evolve... and evolution, in turn, extends the life of the system.26"
Project A1 was a quick turn-around effort that required iteration #2 of the product
platform to be designed, implemented, and tested within a year. This schedule pressure
also made the project unique. The understanding by the engineering team was that the
customer needed the system (which was an upgrade to an existing system supplied by
another contractor) to be deploy-able within a year. In concert with the theme of the
product platform, this system would be the next iteration of the common product, based
on project TS (the first iteration), but a 12 month delivery would make that challenging
to say the least.
At the beginning of the project, the engineering baseline was to completely reuse the
core system (up to, but not including the Graphical User Interface, GUI) from project
TS, but put a new presentation layer on it by changing the GUI only. The GUI changes
would be necessary because the customer's plan to operate the system was slightly
different than that of the TS customer. The degree of the difference was an incorrect
assumption perpetuated by a lack of completeness in the customer's specification. As
the significance of the difference in operating concept (or CONOPs) became fully
understood, the product platform team realized, from their systems engineering
experience, that changes in CONOP can have deep rippling effects on system design.
Figure 10 illustrates the decision point facing the product platform team: to embrace the
change in CONOP and the changes in direction it would cause on the common product,
or to hold the design firm and try to find a political solution to the problem. This might
mean retraining the existing operator base to use the system in a way that was different
than the legacy system Al was replacing. A solution like this is not simple or trivial to
'make happen'.
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Figure 10: The decision to embrace specialization or not
The management team of the product line made little of this decision. They hardly
realized that a decision was upon them, and that fact is key. The reason is that years of
custom product development had made them firmly believe that the systems should do
what the customer dictates want; after all, they're paying the bill for the engineering
time. This lack of strength in direction of the product line was facilitated by the
schedule push - the common perception was that a political solution might take months
to get full agreement and customer approval. To meet the deadline, the 'work-around'
that allowed the changed CONOPs and system design might just be easier. The
unforeseen issue was that this would create larger problems down the road when the
product platform team tried to maintain a common baseline between the portfolio of
projects and systems.
Project A1's change in CONOP resulted in some modest changes in design of the core
signal processing of the system. The impact was felt more significantly at the database
and GUI layers. This highlights the challenge of determining the correct level for reuse.
What parts are in and what are out? If the GUI itself should have been out, then no
project would be able to easily reuse the GUIs from Al if they wanted to use the system
in that way. If the GUIs were in, then maybe they should've been better designed for
reuse, layering. Maintaining a common GUI is hard; it must be "thin" layer so that the
changes in concept of operation don't affect it as much.
Case #4: Project TR - This project was also an illustration of the challenge of accepting
a customization request. It is a case where the motivation for that request was very
strong - to fill an unmet need in a Quick Reaction Capability manner. The case is
detailed in section 4.2 as it also demonstrates the hybrid team example.
We draw valuable insights from these cases and present them in a manner useful by
similar projects. Further, experience with the product platform technique presents
cases that may reveal how it requires the rigor of strict product focus to best serve the
business. The main output of this work is to offer conclusions that can be used to shape
business area strategy and reuse techniques based on specific conditions of the potential
projects or product families. The product platform approach has served the subject
organization rather well, though not without its bumps in the road. As we will discuss in
section 5, there are conditions under which the product platform will work best. Many
of those, but not all, have been exhibited on the Odin reuse program.
3.5 Preliminary hypotheses
At this point in the research, we can articulate four hypotheses. They are certainly
preliminary, though informed by our literature search and interview responses.
1. First, successful reuse programs take time to establish and pay dividends.
Immature ones create an environment where client projects are hard to execute.
As the reuse library and product platform matures, everything gets easier
(socialization, productivity, requirements compliance) and the payback is
significant.
2. In a reuse library, it's not too hard to "clone and own", the difficulty comes with
maintaining a single software baseline and the merging changes back into the
baseline.
3. A successful reuse program requires a funding source for maintenance and tech
refreshment. The business model must support this, and it should probably be
an operational cost expense rather than research and development investment.
4. Highly leveraged projects create a high stress factor environment that results in
lower cost performance and development productivity.
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In the next section, we will analyze project data (cost, productivity, reuse %, system
performance) and survey results to search for patterns of causality that reinforce or
weaken our hypotheses.
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4 Analysis of Cases
To this point, we've discussed logical cause and effect relationships that present certain
hypotheses about software reuse in the defense electronics industry. These hypotheses
are substantiated by past literature and interviews conducted as part of this research.
We now seek to further solidify the business & technical reuse model presented in
section 1 by supporting it with an analysis of the options and strategies open to
managers. The data to be analyzed comes from two sources: subject interviews and
project data. The interview results are contained below in section 4.1.
4.1 Interview Results
To draw on the sponsor organization's wealth of experience in the software reuse and
product platforms, interviews were conducted with many individuals that had
involvement with the reuse projects described above. In total, 25 interviews were
conducted with developers, architects, and software and program managers throughout
the organization. The responsibility distribution of the interviewees is shown in Figure
11, below.
Figure 11: Research Interviews drew from a substantive cross section of the organizations
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The respondents represented the gamut of experience and influence in the Odin
program, from original architects and developers to software managers and directors on
client projects. Drawing input from such a diverse group enabled us to fully represent
the issues seen over the lifecycle of the reuse program.
The intent of the interview process was threefold:
1. To help shape the research if subjects had significant insight that could form the
basis of a hypothesis.
2. To serve as a data set for correlating patterns within the reuse organization
3. To help baseline the sponsor organization by getting enough views of 'how it
really happened' so that we don't rely on a single person's view of past events.
The interview subjects were asked a series of questions in two types. One type was an
open-ended question that allowed them to provide as much information and/or opinion
as they chose. The other type of question required them to rate some aspect of the
project, organization, or system on a scale (1 to 5). This type of question can later be
used as a data set. The interview instrument is contained in Appendix 1, but some
representative questions are:
Reuse as a Design Driver: How important was software reuse in the architect and
design phases?
What factors constrained the project significantly?
How successful was the software reuse initiative on this project?
The results of the interviews were informative. They paint an effective picture of the
reuse program within the organization. Some highlights of the interviews are shown in
the histogram plots to follow, while the full set of notes and quotes are contained in the
appendix. First, we see from Figure 12 that most interviewees chose to rate 'reuse' as an
important design driver between 4 and 5 on a scale of 1 to 5. This tells us that the
overall reuse movement was important across the organization on many projects and to
many individuals.
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Figure 12: Reuse was often an important design driver
Figure 13 summarizes subjects' responses when asked if the software reuse library was
suitable to their needs. This is an umbrella question to basically ask if the developers
felt they were being provided all the tools they needed and could get the project
executed with the reuse library as an engineering baseline from which to start. Overall,
the responses showed that the repository was suitable. This might indicate that the
R&D investment needed to create the repository was worthwhile.
Figure 13: The Software repository was largely seen as suitable
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In order to baseline the projects, the subjects were asked if the projects targeted for
reuse were technically challenging or not, as compared to others in their career. The
responses were quite varied, showing that the organization did not select especially hard
or easy projects as reuse candidates.
Figure 14: The technical challenge varied as expected
Figure 15 shows responses to the question about how well system performance was
achieved. A rating of 4 meant "met expectations", 5 meant "surpassed", and 3 meant
"slightly disappointed". This data shows that the subject systems largely met
expectations, but some fell short. This variance may be indicative of many factors at
work simultaneously. Over the decades of past projects, the sponsor had a reputation
for technical excellence but poor cost performance. This data could be explained as
being reflective of a more competitive business environment than the years prior. More
competition would lead to cost cutting, and system performance might suffer. An
alternate explanation would be that the reuse program blunted developers' focus and
system performance occasionally suffered.
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Figure 15: System performance was usually achieved
Figure 16 shows the perceived success of the team when measured by their ability to
participate in and contribute to a reuse program. It has the same definitions of success
as the previous system performance question. This data is skewed slightly higher than
that of the system performance assessment. Besides simply achieving more reuse
success than technical performance, an alternate explanation could be that the projects
could be seen as successful against this measure by simply using the reuse baseline.
Being a software reuse "taker", but not a contributor back to the baseline would be a
case of less overall reuse success, but might not reveal itself in this interview. We will
consider the achieved reuse success on par with the achieved system performance in this
collection of projects.
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Figure 16: Reuse was also successfully achieved
4.2 Project Variables
We will now examine the cases discussed in section 3.4 by tabulating and correlating the
metrics and data about each project. Some of these metrics are secondary values that
are only revealed when one looks hard at the reuse patterns of the organization.
Although many variables will be used, a summary of some primary reuse dimensions are
shown below in Table 1.
Table 1: The management 'variables' present in a project's design
Planned Reuse Target reuse % (by LOC from SW Management direction
estimate)
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Do the needed components exist
already? Is this a big part of the
new mainline?
Project Team orientation summarizes the overall approach taken by management as
they plan to execute a project and give it the highest likelihood for success. It is made
up of project team design and a centrality of the project to its core reuse library or
mainstream software development of the product platform.
From experience in the wider industry as well as in the subject organization, there are
fundamentally different team organizations for reuse. We will discuss three main types,
as they persisted in the sponsor's software development organization. The types,
enumerated in Table 2 and Figure 17, are also described in further detail in section 3.3.1.
Table 2: Types of development teams
Common product
team, or "model"
Hybrid team
Integrated with the reuse organization
Pulled from the reuse organization to cross-
pollinate, but physically separated
Common
Product
Group
Figure 17: Project Teams vary in proximity to the "core"
The other major contributor to reuse strategy is how central the project is to the overall
product line. In the client organization, some development efforts were vital enough to
the business' success that the organization was expected to morph around that project to
make it successful. These projects would have some strategic value such as 'TS' and'A1'
in Table 3, below.
Table 3: Uniqueness can drive a Project's strategic value
TS Core Product
First Product
Platform
'Specialization'
Client ProgramTR
This project was the first to reuse the core product and
specialize portions of it. It was the first example of true
software reuse as it was intended in this product line.
A client user of the software family
The sponsor business executed subject projects over roughly 10 years in software reuse
effort. These projects are shown on a timeline in Figure 18, below.
Figure 18: Software reuse project timeline
Project TR is an example of another point in the 'Reuse Strategy' space. This project was
characterized by an urgent need to satisfy the customer's schedule requirement. As a
defense contractor, some of the business' proudest moments come from meeting the
warfighter's urgent need as fast as possible if it can save the lives of our soldiers. The TR
project had such a need to bring a system to deployable maturity quickly and fill an
unmet requirement.
The system created for the TR project was also different than earlier instantiations of
the product line. It had some new capabilities and lacked some existing ones that gave it
and an unclear future in the line and allowed some principals to debate its place in the
reuse organization. What followed was a rationale allowing the TR project to be
physically separated from the reuse organization. This was motivated by the thought
that the system could most expediently be developed away from the distractions of the
larger organization. The resultant system (with its strange mix of capabilities) was also
expected to be more of a 'one-off and could possibly not need to be returned to the
baseline.
Planned Reuse is the extent to which the project expects to reuse existing code from the
software library. On the surface, this indicates the similarity of the new system to ones
already existing in the library. At a deeper level, it might also indicate the
aggressiveness that the architecture and business capture team pursued the
opportunity. There were cases in the client organization where a system could be best
build with method "B" of a set of components, but method "A" already existed in the
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product line. Despite lower system performance, method A might be chosen in order to
contain cost. A key learning from the planning and early execution stages of reuse
projects is that the proposed architecture must be communicated to the development
team so that they can build the system by method A, which is the only way they will
meet the requirements within the funding available. This planned reuse variable can
strongly direct a project's execution and outcome, possibly along important dimensions
other than cost, though cost might have driven the reuse target.
The Challenge ofSystem Performance summarizes the influence on the project that
comes from purely solving a 'hard problem'. Although Jacobson ('97) points out that a
common complaint is that "Reused code components are too slow."27 The retort of a
well-designed code repository should be that "[poor performance] is a design flaw," and
performance requirements are also a part of the reuse program. Nonetheless, one could
see that when all other conditions are equal, a project with a very challenging technical
problem might have a harder time meeting its requirements when directed to use a
particular reuse library, even if that library was thought to be capable of meeting said
requirements. On the other hand, it is conceivable that a reuse library could include a
set of components that uniquely met a common performance requirement, and enabled
the system to meet the challenge of system performance.
In the case of the client's experience, very few components or threads have the unique
and designed-in ability to meet performance requirements. This means that the
challenge of system performance becomes an influence on overall project success. At
this point, we should also note that other commercial processes have been considered.
For example, an open source approach was examined for its associated modularity that
has been shown to enhance reuse. While this is true, it is challenged to meet unique
performance requirements with such a modular architecture. Another note is that the
sponsor's component framework architecture, we will see, is actually very modular and
may not see large benefits in this area from an open source approach adopted primarily
for its modularity.
27 Jacobson et al. '97
The Available Software Library and the suitability thereof is another major variable
that modifies the potential outcome of a development project whose baseline includes
major reuse. The 'design' of a project must be driven by what is available in the software
library. Fortunately, this is often true in practice. Only two of the client case studies
exhibit poor understanding of the software repository at the project's proposal and
inception. In one case (project RS), the reuse repository was thought to be more mature
and capable than it was in fact. In another case (CA), the library might have been well
understood at the time that the technical baseline was established (prior to actual
execution), but the architecture and design teams did not develop the system according
to the proposed technical baseline.
In general, if the software library is rich in components that satisfy the project's
functionality and performance requirements, then not only is the overall development
effort low, but so is the execution risk. The maturity of the library is also a key factor in
this area, for if the library is full, but only of 'demo quality' code, the suitability of that
library to a major development project with hard requirements will be poor. When this
suitability is poor, the project always suffers. It can be minimal, if the gap between
understanding and reality is small; or there can also be major suffering, if that gap is
large.
4.3 Analysis of variables
Armed with these variables for design of software projects, we can analyze existing
project data for patterns that correlate with project and reuse program success. There is
much to learn by analyzing past reuse projects in detail. In addition to the 'soft data'
approach of the interview, a 'hard data' analysis is fruitful for its objectivity and
unambiguousness.
Revisit the research question - From the first general question of:
What insight does the client's experience with software reuse projects reveal about the
impact of input conditions and management decisions on project success?
... we use our project data to search for patterns that lead to the relevant themes of good
software reuse. The available project data comes from 3 sources:
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Software management metrics: All projects in a CMMI level 3 organization28
maintain metrics on software development. CMMI (Capability Maturity Model
Integrated) is a multi-function process improvement approach and assessment by the
Software Engineering Institute. Fortunately, the client organization maintains a SEI
CMMI level 3 process in its development groups, and a CMM level 4 process for
software engineering. Consistent with a process maturity of this high level is a practice
of metric collection. For any project of more than 1000 development hours, software
project leadership records at least the data set described below in Table 4.
Table 4: Software Metrics relevant to research
Delivered Lines of Amount of software in full system, as Planned and actual quantities are
Code (DLOC) delivered. Includes reused code. relevant, and comparison
Equivalent Lines of Amount of software written new or Will consider planned and actual
Code (ELOC) modified on a project.
Planned SW hours Planned size of software effort Represents the size of the project
Actual SW hours How many hours a project actually took Represents the size of the
to execute project, comparison to plan
CPI, Cost Performance How much money an effort spent to A key indicator of project
Index [o-i scale] execute, relative to plan execution
SPI, Schedule How much time it took to execute an A key indicator of project
Performance Index effort, relative to plan execution
Reuse % Percentage of delivered software that A central measure of how much
was from a reuse source (not new or reuse a project attained; Will
modified) consider planned and actual
Productivity How much software is written per unit A key indicator of project
[LOC/day] time (only new or modified) efficiency
The most common and important values are: planned code size (ELOC and DLOC),
planned SW effort, code development progress and growth, and productivity. This rich
28 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi/
data set shows us project trends over time, and actual vs. planned performance of the
software effort on a project. The core set of metrics is collected by the client software
managers in virtually all projects. Due to the latitude afforded a manager, there are
some variances in the full set of metrics maintained when we look across many projects.
Some projects may be very small or very short schedule, in which the value of the metric
at anything other than a summary level is not worth the time and disruption required to
measure it. Despite these variances, the data set is invaluable to this analysis and
supplies us with many of the quantities discussed below.
Project Cost Data: Without exception, costs are tracked for every project
conducted in the client's organization. This data provides us with an overall measure of
cost and schedule performance. It can be examined at any level that the project tracks
costs, (at least summary, engineering, Integrated Product Team, and functional)
consistent with the project's Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).
Interview Data: The considered viewpoint taken by the engineers and
developers that support a project is important as it can incorporate complex
relationships between issues that may not be reflected by hard data. In addition to
answers to interview questions, some composite quantities and secondary values are
used in the analysis. They are listed below in Table 5.
Table 5: Additional metrics drawn from the interview data set
Stress factor A composite measure of cost and
schedule pressure
Illustrates how projects execute
in different stress environments
Suitability of Software The development teams' assessment of Represents the readiness of the
Library how well the library met their needs repository for the project
System Performance How a system met its performance Will consider planned and
requirements achieved
Achieved Reuse A subjective measure of how well the Resultant reuse relative to
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(Interview Estimate) team did at reusing SW, relative to expectation
expectations
Through interviews and anecdotal research, we have developed the following
hypotheses about the pattern of project performance in the client's software
development environment:
e Without reasonably low expectations for productivity and cost competitiveness
on the first reuse projects, those projects will suffer unmet expectations due to an
immature reuse product and process. Effective software reuse is only possible
once the product and the organization get further along the curve in Figure 19,
below.
* High stress factor projects will have poor performance.
* Unrealistic expectations and mandated reuse strategies will negatively impact the
development team. This could manifest in lower productivity, system
performance, or another quality not captured by the interviews.
CtafppicoM
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Figure i: Cost and Effort start high but fall over time (Jacobson et al '97)
The first hypothesis is upheld by our project data, as shown in Figure 20, showing poor
cost performance when projects were executed with an unsuitable repository. The
converse is also true; a highly suitable repository yields good cost performance.
Figure 20: It takes a suitable (mature) SW library to be cost effective
This figure uses cost performance index (CPI) because it is a measure of performance
against expectation (actual cost of work performed divided by the budgeted cost of work
planned - see appendix). Later patterns will also look at productivity. The 'suitability"
quantity is a weighted average of interview data with the planned reuse baseline. It is
also normalized by interview respondents' own tendencies towards software reuse.
In this collection of data, we can infer that a significant cause of project failure was an
immature reuse product and process. The cases TS, RS, and A3 were all very early in the
software reuse program, and consequently early in the lifecycle of the product family.
The project team spent too much time addressing shortfalls in the capabilities and
robustness of the library and not enough time on the new and planned parts of the
project that would get it 'completed' on time. This drove costs higher relative to the
plan, which in turn reduces CPI.
The suitability of the software library also has a direct effect on how much code is reused
by the development teams. This is intuitive - if the code is worth using, they'll use it -
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and serves as a good logic check on this research. Figure 21, below, shows this effect by
plotting reuse percentages with the suitability of our case study projects.
Figure 21: If the library is suitable to the project, developers will (re)use it
Project Organization: Another dimension along which we can compare projects is the
type of development team organization chosen by management. For many projects of
high visibility, strategic, or reuse importance, management chooses to execute the
project in a way that doesn't permit the team much latitude or flexibility. Management's
rationale is that they need to 'keep an eye' on that team, providing 'guidance' along the
way, and thereby ensuring that the project is a success. See section 3.4, Case studies, for
a comparison of the project organizations used by the client.
In Figure 22, below, we see the three project organization types plotted along the x-axis.
A centralized, common product group performing the development work is a "1",
consistent with Table 2. A team acting as a'client' of the common product group is a
5", and a hybrid team (somewhere in the middle, see section 3.3.1 and Figure 17) is a
"3", or shaded just above or below that value. The numerical values used here for
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plotting purposes are measures of the degree of separation from the core reuse group. If
the core reuse group executes a project, it is a "1", while a client project is very removed
and plotted as a "5".
These organization types are shown with the resulting stress factor observed on the
project. Stressfactor is an averaged value taken from the interview results that
indicates the overall schedule or cost pressure of the project. As the pattern and
trendline indicates, high stress factors are coincident with centralized common product
development teams. This is likely a result of the underlying cause of that chosen
development team style, i.e. management's desire to closely monitor a highly important
strategic project causes the stress factor. This coincident stress factor is useful to
managers who might personally find it important to alleviate stress on a project,
regardless of its importance. A suggestion might be to employ an opposite strategy in
these cases: stack the team with highly capable individuals, and let them go work in an
apparently low visibility manner. Next, we will see that this stress factor leads to other
negative outcomes on a project.
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Figure 22: Stress Factor decreases with team independence
As we see from Figure 22, three of the four high stress factor cases (TS, A1, TR) were
common product development. The fourth (RS), was a client project, but performed
very early on in the reuse program's lifecycle. This is illustrated by Figure 18, above, and
shows that RS was only the second reuse project executed in the organization. The
theme here is that TS, A1, and RS felt real pain during execution because they were so
early on in the program's lifecycle. It is also worth noting that at the time of RS, the
hybrid option for teams did not exist in practical terms, since management pushed
teams to one extreme or the other. The lack of documentation and client support made
it very difficult to be a client project at that time. The overall immaturity of the product
made it very difficult for a common product development team to execute smoothly
soon after the time of RS, especially under the pressure they felt to get the common
product launched while meeting customer requirements and schedule.
System Performance is an important concept both as an independent variable driving
the effort to find a solution, and as a less tangible quantity affecting the team as they are
challenged to solve the problem. In this second manner, required system performance
is a very important factor, as it affects a development team strongly. Many developers
can insulate themselves from pressure by management, regardless of the frenetic pace of
a poorly planned project. They find sanity in the simple "do or do not" aspect of trying
to solve an engineering problem. When that problem proves significantly challenging
though, even seasoned developers will feel pressure to deliver, and that is when the
stress factor goes up.
Although stress factor is too vague of to be an independent variable, it reveals an
important insight when used in the second order to illustrate the effect on cost
performance. Its negative effect on team productivity, coupled with the multiple
intangible effects on groups that interface with the software team serve to hamper the
cost performance of stressful projects. Figure 23, below, shows this relationship rather
strongly. Since CPI represents performance over hundreds of tasks and thousands of
hours, a couple tenths in CPI on a large development project is significant.
Figure 23: Cost performance also suffers with Stress Factor
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Productivity is a very important metric to software managers across many industries. It
indicates how well the developers are performing on an objective scale, and is usually
measured in Lines of Code (LOC) per day. Though absolute scales vary for different
software languages, relative values taken in longitudinal views within an organization
can show how a team is performing compared to earlier efforts. In this study, we may
question management's rationale for leading a team along a particular reuse plan. In
this case, it is helpful to look at productivity as well as performance against the plan to
normalize how well the team was doing regardless of how aggressive the plan was. This
is shown in Figure 24, below, where the highly leveraged projects (Al, A2, CE), do not
illustrate high productivity. The projects that pleasantly surprise us with great code
writing performance are those that had low expectations stemming from mandated
reuse. TR and A3 did, in fact, beat their planned reuse factor by 59% and 23%,
respectively. This shows that high reuse level is possible, but demonstrated more often
when management doesn't push it. This could mean that the team leadership is not
particularly effective at driving the team to effective software development via reuse.
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Figure 24: Less mandated reuse for higher productivity
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4.4 Cost Models
Sooner or later in every cost reduction or process improvement initiative, we must
answer the question of how well the investment is paying off. In this case, one answer
lies in the application of a cost model, like those discussed in section 2. The Gaffney and
Durek model29 used for our subject organization shows that all Odin reuse projects
considered have a cost factor, C, of less than 1. C is "the cost of software development
for a given product relative to all new code (for which C = 1)". For each of the projects
we have discussed, C is shown below in Table 6. Of the two models shown, C2 - the cost
of development model, is more realistic as it accounts for the added cost of developing
for reuse and amortizes the benefit over a finite number of consumer projects. We
chose a 30% factor for the cost of incorporating reusable software into a new baseline,
and a 20% added cost to develop code as reusable. For consumer projects (n), we
identified the known candidate projects either planning to reuse the code or similar in
requirements that their likelihood of reuse was high. We then added one more project
to the model for a downstream consumer that we didn't know about.
Table 6: The Gaffney and Durek Model shows significant cost reductions
T2 66.6% 78.1% 6.00
T3 45.9% 64.5% 5.00
A3 39.8% 60.4% 5.00
A4 45.8% 69.0% 4.00
RS 53.3% 73.3% 4.00
CA 70.1% 95.7% 2.00
CE 32.8% 90.4% 2.00
TR 62.0% 75.1% 5.00
Al 36.5% 54.6% 6.00
29 Gaffney, J. E., & Durek, T. A. (1989) Software reuse - key to enhanced productivity: some quantitative
models. Inf. Software Technology, 31,5,258-267. as cited in Frakes & Terry '96
We see that there are only a handful of projects (shaded) with cost factor (C2) below
70%, which shows that the reuse initiative was an acceptable investment. With higher
estimates for n, reuse consumers, these numbers are much more favorable. It is notable
that some of the better performing projects along other dimensions, like CE, don't show
that well here. In this case, it's because CE only 'feeds' two other similar projects, as its
content is somewhat esoteric.
The preceding analyses have led us to conclusions and recommendations about team
design, stress factors, and cost performance. Those insights are synthesized and
included in the next two sections. Although this work may serve to improve the reuse
effectiveness of the organization, a measure of cost effectiveness for the Odin program
has already been performed. The money saved over just the first 4 years of the reuse
library's existence was surprisingly high, as shown in Table 7. The total amounted to
(roughly) 56% of the business unit's annual sales. These numbers should speak for
themselves, showing that each project's software effort was reduced by (on average)
80% from what it would have been if there was no reuse repository from which to draw
and the system had to be created from scratch. Certainly, this is a significant success for
the reuse program. Unfortunately, competitors were employing similar techniques, so
the focus would shift from launching the reuse program to sustaining it.
Table 7: Total accrued cost savings by the Odin Software Reuse Program
Estimated SW Estimated Contract
Odin LOC % Odin Reuse Savings Reuse Savings (%
Project Bid for Bid Total Reuse of (rel. to Avg division annual
ID Reuse LOC Total LOC contract size) sales)
A 92,847 145,542 63.8% 87% 6%
B 113896 143436 79.4% 107% 8%
C 70097 97475 71.9% 66% 5%
D 122551 191094 64.1% 115% 8%
E 78650 159853 49.2% 74% 5%
F 69428 83548 83.1% 65% 5%
G 73210 83350 87.8% 69% 5%
H 31570 74973 42.1% 30% 2%
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1 147590 191024 77.3% 139% 10%
J 55141 109055 50.6% 52% 4%
Total 805% 56%
Average 1 _ 80% 6%
5 Recommendations
After searching the body of literature for guidance on software reuse, examining the
sponsor's case studies, and analyzing project data for relationships, we see the following
themes:
" A concerted and sustained reuse program is not a trivial undertaking. It requires
an earnest and sustained executive commitment, investment, a solid architecture,
and execution that never loses sight of the reasons for having a reuse program.
. The cost/benefit balance can be looked at a few different ways, but an
organization must obviously make its investment back and aims for the ROI to be
as high as possible.
* A reuse effort takes time to grow and mature. Early projects will see challenges
and successful execution does not become more easily attainable until later, when
the process and the repository are mature.
. Through the large number of reuse projects studied, a common theme is that the
human factor is often a major cause of lack of adoption or full success of a reuse
program.
5.1 Earlier Hypotheses
By simply examining project data in section 4, our hypotheses were fairly narrow when
drawn directly from the data. They are listed below, along with a corresponding
updated hypothesis that is broader.
Hypothesis A Larger Implication
1. The early projects in the sponsor's It takes time to make a reuse program
reuse program fell below expectations effective. The organization should be fully
due to the immature reuse repository aware of the path they are on and set
and process. expectations accordingly.
2. High stress factor projects will have Highly leveraged projects often exhibit low
cost performance, possibly due to decreased
poor performance
3. Overly high expectations and Productivity and performance suffer when a
mandated reuse strategies will project's development team is directed to
negatively impact the development reuse too much or create software with too
team. many reuse consumers.
5.2 Updated Hypotheses
By viewing the preliminary data-analysis-based findings through the lenses of the
industry literature and survey responses, these hypotheses can be refined, with some
new observations added.
Although the literature suggests that the architecture is the technical part of reuse that's
vital to get right 3o, the sponsor's experience suggests that the next decision - what
portions of a product platform are common - is just as important. The scope of reuse
on a product should match the commonality of the customer's requirements. If the use
case and requirements of a system is so different than its previous applications, those
parts that are different should be considered for exclusion from the common reuse
product.
'Fishbowl' projects carry extra baggage. The analysis of project data shows that highly
visible, highly leveraged projects cause an increased stress factor on the development
team. This, in turn, can negatively impact productivity and cost performance.
The cost/benefit model31 helps illustrate the situations that will provide the highest
payoff for the reuse effort. Although these may seem obvious, it is important to
remember that software reuse is only effective when:
* The incremental costs of implementing a reusable component is low
" The cost to reuse a component (integration) is low
* The payback benefit from a large number of reuse instances is high
30 Jacobson et al, '97
31 See the application of the Gaffney & Durek model in section 4.4
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productivity.
The hard choices made during the proposal and planning phases usually represent cost
cutting by assuming a task can be done with a less expensive approach. These
assumptions and adjustments in approach must be carried through to the execution. If
the total funding available for a proposed effort is less than the estimated cost for the
solution developed by the engineering team, then cost trimming measures are
sometimes taken. These steps can cause changes in the technical baseline of the project
to an approach that is easier to implement (and thus saves money), but suffers in some
other measure (like performance). The change in the approach may save money,
possibly by using an older, less capable version of the product platform while still
meeting the requirements. Any changes in approach to other portions of the reuse
library must be communicated to the development team as new direction so that the
project can execute within its new expected budget.
The business model for software reuse in the defense electronics industry requires some
extra thought. The fundamental problem is that each customer and contract expects to
only pay for the work done that directly contributes to their deliverables, but also take
delivery of as capable a system as possible at the end. Additional capability for the same
amount of funding is enabled by the ability to reuse portions of the system from prior
efforts. Customers see this as a discriminator when selecting the contractor. So, no one
wants to pay to make software or products reusable, yet everyone wants to take
advantage once they are developed. The complication in the defense industry is that
customers pay for most of the development, and they can direct what their money is
spent on. It is interesting to note that the customer funding issue may only be
applicable in the long term, steady-state business model. Initial development may be
funded with internal R&D dollars, but the reuse model must sustain itself by paying for
enhancements, maintenance, and some upgrades. That sustainability is the real
challenge to the business model, and its cost must be borne in some way.
5.3 Summary of Recommendations
The sponsor of this research executed a foray into software reuse for roughly 10 years.
As we have previously discussed, that effort was well thought out, architected, and
designed. It progressed from simple software reuse in a component-framework
69
architecture to full system product platforms. The challenges faced by the sponsor
organization raised questions about how reuse might be better executed in the future.
Of the two research questions, the second remains unanswered: "What a prescriptive
framework that will help steer future projects?" Revisiting our graphical view of the
situation, in Figure 25, we note that it's really the roadmap that we're searching for.
Business
Requirements
System
Requirements
Software Reuse
Program Stratel
Figure 25: Multiple sources of requirements shape the execution roadmap
A way to easily identify a project's roadmap is sought. This framework for software
reuse can be prescribed to the client organization and in other relevant subject areas.
First, we look at the inputs and constraints, and ask what guidance can be given to the
decision maker. If we take a straightforward approach to developing the project's
roadmap, we note that identifying the primary driving influence is vitally important.
This is similar to developing a value proposition for the project, which identifies the
value being created in by its efforts and the ranked importance of those valuable
outcomes.
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Table 8: Driving Constraint-based framework
cost Client or As much as Aim for high reuse - be a
Hybrid possible consumer. Keep the
Team distractions out
Hybrid
Team
Product Platform; Core Reuse
design/implement Team
for reuse
Scope or System
Performance
Client
Project
An amount
appropriate to
low risk
As much as
possible
Only what is
already proven
to meet the
requirements
Ensure technical baseline is
bounded to pieces of the reuse
library that can be assembled
with low risk of reiteration;
Keep the distractions out
Don't accept too many new
requirements
Ensure 20% extra cost of
'making it reusable' is
included.
Only reuse components that
have proven their ability to
meet the performance
requirements
Consider (at least some) new
development.
Delivered system will be
just like project Q (an
earlier one), with only
minor changes
We only have time to do
it once - ensure a low-
risk design
System is part of a
product line; many
influences will appear
Departures from the
common product may be
necessary
Even with a framework like this, project leadership must fight the tendency to say that
they have all of the constraints listed. At most, two should be identified as being
"driving constraints". In addition to the model for project organization type and
expectation setting, many other factors will influence the sponsor's ability to practice
large scale reuse. Product platforms or large scale software reuse in the defense
electronics sector is challenging and only a good fit if you have the right conditions - the
following are necessary conditions we've discussed earlier in this work:
a. The project must have a customer that's amenable to tailoring some of his
requirements to match the direction of the common product.
Schedule
b. The reuse team must create an architecture that supports reuse.
c. For a project to be cost effective, it needs a software reuse library that's
mature.
d. The organization must have a reuse process that enables good citizenship
consuming of reusable components or subsystems and returning them to the
repository. "Clone and own" reuse and branching is easy, merging back is the
challenge that must be mastered.
e. There must be enough projects to amortize the cost of development and
maintenance. A small number of projects will not justify the use of product
platforms.
As evidence of programs demonstrating these conditions, we can contrast the reuse
examples in Table 9. This broader experience base from other reuse efforts within the
enterprise shows some key points that come with different kinds of reuse programs.
Table 9: A Comparison of reuse programs
Product platform
(generic)
Substantial R&D
benefits from well
designed platforms32
A software
development
organization
Nothing beyond the
scope of the common
product
Odin Strong component- A business area and Shouldn't grow
framework related government beyond span of
architecture; mature research labs understanding the
reuse repository architecture
User-forge Common-man Grass-roots Doesn't provide
accessibility, more reusable subsystems,
flexible just modules of code
EW system "example High performance Single software Not designed for
A" development team reuse; extensibility
limited
Intelligence Business Model Larger; developers Shouldn't grow
Community "example proven more already using a beyond span of
B" sustainable thus far common language in understanding the
the community architecture
32 Meyer and Seliger, 1998
In addition to the framework above, the difficult question remains of how to generate
sustainable reuse funding. This analyst's recommendation of a primary source is to
capture this cost and pass it on to the projects through modest license fees. What might
seem like a trivial amount for one project could really add up once the reuse community
grows with numerous customers and contracts. The sponsor's organization never
charged for licenses, nor attained critical mass of income to offset this cost. Another
source of funding is to identify the software library for one of its uses: it is a technology
push in some markets. To support a push model, research and development customers
must be found, sometimes for the sake of advancing the technology. A deeper and long-
term relationship with Customer Research and Development (CRaD) sponsors is in
order.
If these recommendations prove fruitful and some of the specific conditions are met, the
sponsor will achieve what few in their industry have: a large-scale, long-lasting, effective
software reuse program. Not only will it save the company and customers money, but
ultimately the taxpayers as well.
6 Conclusion
This work has tried to examine software reuse in challenging business and technical
environments. Although the subject of software reuse is not unique to any one industry,
defense electronics includes a unique combination of business and management
challenges with stringent system functional and performance requirements. In this
arena, we see an incredibly high need for dependable systems to help bring home safely
the men and women that are put in harm's way in defense of our country.
Other areas with similar constraints are: federal contracting for FAA and NASA. The
difference between these and the commercial world of high tech computing, or the
automotive industry is that the need in defense is to solve a tough problem that no one
has solved before. Meeting this need is motivated by the inherent responsibility to
equip our warfighters with systems that keep them as safe as possible. To do this, the
tough problems must be solved quickly and fielded expeditiously. The motivations in
the commercial sector are often more focused on time to market and ultimately profit.
Although profit can be an extremely powerful motivator, it may not percolate
throughout an organization in the same way as protecting our warfighters does.
The sponsor of this research is a large defense contracting organization with many
divisions, sectors, and business units. The subject business unit, in particular has
offered a colorful experience base from which to analyze software reuse as it applies to
developing systems to solve hard problems.
The subject of effective software reuse in the defense industry is intriguing and
interesting from both an academic and practitioner's perspective for the following
reasons:
I Government push for Solving hard problems with Difficult requirements can
'better, faster, cheaper" ever-decreasing resources be met with enough time
(money) and money. But both are
also constrained
Projectsprimarily Busnes models have been, inna fundingu issarce
custme funed tpclydesied around a piprduct 'Platform
outside funding sources wtcomralbusns
moeIsno a rfectfit
To explore each of these unique attributes is to gain understanding of the influential
forces that shape execution and outcomes in software reuse programs and the projects
of which it is comprised. The inherent complexity ofsystems designed in the defense
electronics arena flows from a need to keep systems:
* Small and light (increased endurance of an aircraft)
* Very or multi functional - having two similar systems when one can be
'extended' to do both is a waste of space, money, and time. Most, if not all
systems must meet hundreds or thousands of requirements. They are simply
more capable than an iPod.
* High performance - missions performed in our nation's defense must be capable
of thwarting an adversary and bringing our warfighters home safely. Systems
must therefore perform their functions to the highest performance level possible.
* Seemingly un-complex to the user and without need for extreme training,
logistics, and support.
For these reasons, systems are often made of custom or semi custom hardware with
increasing levels of software doing the hard math, heavy lifting, or higher intelligence.
As we discussed in section 3.2, software systems have been used to maintain hardware
footprints and interfaces while allowing for upgrade paths.
Cost Pressure - Defense contracting is simultaneously a customer funded development
and continual cost pressure environment. This stems from the public scrutiny under
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which the budget is viewed and movements within the government such as "Better
Faster, Cheaper" of the late 1990's.
Funding sources - While the positive light of customer funded development shines on
software projects, we must examine the business model. With only 1-3% of sales
devoted to R&D, and then only for things expected to develop real new breakthroughs,
there is no 'bucket of money' for operations and maintenance.
6.1 Findings
Reuse strategies need strong executive support and a robustfunding model. Almost
every article written about software reuse programs cites the need for executive
commitment. The need stems from the support required to secure significant
investment dollars to create the core software architecture and prototype repository.
The sponsor organization began with roughly $20M for these purposes and wrote the
first 100,ooo lines of code. That body of code had no further funding earmarked for its
care and feeding in the first few years. One key uniqueness of the defense industry and
others is the challenge to fund maintenance, bug fix, and tool evolutions. It is a fact
that:
* Software that's used in slightly different ways will exhibit different behavior and
sometimes reveal flaws and uncover bugs.
* Moore's law keeps technology (especially hardware) moving forward at a rapid
pace. Platforms (hardware), tools, and networks evolve and pace must be kept.
" SW vendors are in business to make money and produce new software (versions,
that improve upon the previous) to do just that.
" Improvements are made in the way we interact with our world through software,
and those should be adopted by defense electronics if it makes the warfighter's
job easier and brings home more users safely.
We have shown that meeting these challenges with the classical defense funding model
is difficult. With the adoption of the 'better, faster, cheaper' movement of the late '90s,
the industry saw an end to the fabled large, gravy train projects for well funded and
tolerant customers. And so, despite being paid for development work, a reuse program
must incorporate an operations and maintenance funding stream into the organization's
business model. In section 3.3.2, we saw that the license fee structure has proven
successful for another reuse program within the company. Still other groups inside and
outside the enterprise use customer funded R&D as a source of the funding stream if
they can convince their customer that they are moving the mutually necessary
technology forward.
Reuse team design should be driven by the strategic objectives of each project. As
projects vary throughout the product platform portfolio, so do their organizational
needs. In section 3.3.1 we discussed three team types (core reuse, client, and hybrid).
In section 5.3, we proposed a framework for making the choice of team type as well as
the design drivers for the project. These choices are vital to a manager starting a new
project. In sections 4.2 and 4.3, we saw that projects suffer if saddled with cost or
schedule pressure along with a core reuse objective. Major common product work must
account for the 10-20% increased cost of commonality, and those project teams will feel
the scrutiny of living in a fishbowl for execution. We conclude that projects without a
strong need for strategic reusability be allowed to execute as hybrid types so long as the
organization can account for management of their software baseline after completion. If
that baseline is to become more common, either enhancement or new contract funding
must be obtained to bring it in to the product platform.
The scope of the Product Platform should be limited to what's consistent from project
to project. A product platform approach must think very hard about the scope of the
reusable product. Making a well considered (and correct) decision is the first step to
success. As Jacobson's cookbook for software reuse says, "reuse depends on
architecture". Though our DSMs show that the Odin architecture is very modular and
suited to reuse, we know from 2 projects in particular (TS and HY) that some software
'modules' were not common enough to be reused. These were upper layers of the
architecture, close to the user (tasking and UI's), and resulted in rewrites of existing
code that would've been easier if the reuse of those layers had not been attempted.
Those layers that can change with the use case should be designed to be very thin so
their development as one-off portions can be as short and inexpensive as possible.
This is not to say that the product platform is an incorrect fit. We see commonality
between the classic platform advice from the DoD acquisition community and the SEI,
"... especially given shrinking defense budgets, it makes no sense to build essentially the
same systems over and over."33 ... and from within the core team of the sponsor
organization: "everybody thought they were building something for the last time every 5
years."34 The repeated implementations came to a stop with the product platform, but
the higher layers must be carefully architected in or (probably) out of the common
product.
Project Odin enabled the subject organization to stay competitive and saved an
average of 80% on each project. The project was launched at a critical juncture for the
business and required significant investment. The cost/benefit models discussed in
sections 2 and 4.4 show that it saved the large amounts of money on future projects that
were needed to keep the business competitive. We have discussed that creating and
maintaining a sustained line of product platforms or large scale software reuse in
defense is challenging and only a good fit if you have the right conditions. Detailed in
section 5.3, these conditions are met by the sponsor organization and will serve them
well in the future of their reuse program.
Closing comments: We have considered some seminal works on software reuse by
Kemerer, Poulin, and others. These broad and longitudinal studies provide enough data
points to make strong general statements about software reuse in the industry as a
whole. They do not, however, include cases from the defense electronics industry and so
this work has attempted to project their insights into a new space. We acknowledge that
the best way to study this subject would be a comparative study of head-head
organizations over many years with similar projects. Though the value derived by such
a study would be great, the possibility of executing it, with disparate corporations in a
33 Linnehan, J. (2005) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army. As quoted in DoD Software Product
Line experiences: A Digest of Participant Presentations. The 8th Software Product Line Workshop,
34 Interview quote, subject #3
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competitive landscape is nil. Without such an effort, this work may serve to provide
similar insight, at least to the sponsoring organization, and enable effective software
reuse in the future.
At the highest level of observation over many software intensive projects, projects can be
modeled as having inputs, managerial decisions, execution factors, and resultant
outcomes. They take inputs in the form of programmatic constraints, system
requirements, and an existing software library. Each project's combination of influences
and constraints makes it more suited to one of a few different models of software reuse,
and the manager's challenge is to choose the best fit to enable success of his project and
the business overall. We have developed a framework to guide the manager in designing
projects for overall individual success and contribution to the product portfolio.
Hopefully, this work will serve to 'tighten up' the organization's reuse program and
provide insight into how its valuable portions of solid architecture, process, and team
design can be leveraged into long term sustainability.
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A2: Interview notes and quotes
What follows is a compilation of interview notes. [Text in brackets indicates
paraphrasing for clarity]. Highlighting indicates (possible) inclusion of this quote in the
main text.
Interview Subject #1
Position: Systems Engineer and architect of reuse project
We had two choices: either do what the project wants and meet their requirements, or [hold firm to a
product vision that may not meet their requirements]. We can be responsible for the portfolio to the
[Vice President/General Manager].
There are two ways to look at it: 1. Success is the sum of the success on projects, or 2. We should expect
success to be the non-linear aggregation of the projects.
[initial ideas came from] the Object Management Group. [we considered the] CORBA component model.
The original idea was not to invent a framework but to buy one.
We were realizing that now (c. 1999) we can do in software what we couldn't before. The CORBA
framework model didn't gel in time.
[The reuse program] started with the idea to be a toolkit provider. But they (client programs) weren't
using the tools the best, so we decided to provide more.
Have to have enough critical mass... we never figured out how to run the business to [support the
reuse program]. Maybe you have to feed the beast. Do some things to simply advance the
technology... to product platforms need. Need to sell projects both ways - solve customer's problem and
support the technology push.
product platform approach requires an executive commitment
[Another idea for the financial model is to take some funding from each project and use it to fund the
maintenance effort. You can do it if you declare that in your rates to the fed govt. we never did this in the
reuse project. The reason was probably to maintain the same rates across the company. The division
with the reuse program was not all that large.]
Interview Subject #2
Position: Business Area Technical Director
As the "father" of the reuse program, this interview warranted a departure from the standard
question set.
Q: Why the component/framework model?, why was that the vision for the reuse model?
A: large scale SW reuse was the whole idea; we needed a modular architecture in SW similar
to modules in HW
It needed to support HW independence, scalability, and a very good communication
fabric (3-4 tiered model)
[the principal contributors] started reading like crazy... they considered RUP
We quickly realized that we needed a comp-fw model...
[Looking back], just 00 was largely a failure
Settled on a framework on top of CORBA (almost used corba)
We wanted a well-accepted open standard, this would meet customer pressure for open-ness
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wanted to change things without rebooting
Q: how did the software reuse and common product organization evolve?
A: [Eventually, it] was a support organization; [the SW itself ]it aint really all that portable;
so let's build more hw/sw integrated
We didn't have enough distance and rigor to avoid designing special stuff into the
core."
[we would] build subsets of what we should've built, not the whole thing, and not fully tested
b/c all they wanted was a piece.
We started to design waterfront of what all customers would want.
We argued that we needed to maintain certain amount of IRaD [funding], [otherwise we would
have] no maintenance funding every year. [maybe we] needed to charge maint on contract
[Another group in the company] has a very different SW reuse model: project X starts w
baseline, adds features, but they can't spin it back in, so the next project pays to integrate it
back in.
Another group is model based [Like the Rational Unified Process 00 model]. It's faster [to
change the model] from scratch than if they tried to reuse the code. They wanted to keep
model reusable
Q: what kills the product platform?
A: [One aspect might be] Culture/background... [Theory that] young people might be
better at not hacking through the code; We need a business model that supports
general reusable core and reuse it on a bunch of programs. [We need to learn] and how
to maintain it and maintain the programs.
[Maybe a] business model that's not product based, but program based. Use CRC: classes,
responsibilities and collaborations?
[Near the end of the design phase, we] had a bulletproof architecture. Couldn't stump
ourselves
but then we had to build it. Needed a really strong vision to ride herd
Maybe the component/framework model wasn't robust enough to scale?
We didn't tier out a structure that made it easy to scale.
Maybe we weren't big enough to take independent hw...(A competitor), Argon glomed on to mercury, who had a value added.[We got all confounded about] the IP.
But we could never really say that this sw is open, b/c we kept tying it down.
[In order to have a sustaining business], you gotta have critical mass
But, we can't sell tech to pilots; maybe we weren't close enough to customers.
Also, we didn't show rapid prototyping
Interview Subject #3
Position: DSP Software Engineer
We were challenged by reuse of stuff not necessarily meant for reuse
I usually reuse mostly at the cut and paste level
00 was too hard to understand, hurts maintenance.
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Every five years someone says "I'm gonna write this for the last time"
Overall, the 00 benefits were not realized
The viability was challenged by lack of talking to users.
Our goals were too high given what we might have seen what the company
commitment was going to be and when it was going to stop.
Interview Subject #4
Position: Project Manager
When we started, everyone was new at it. We didn't know well how to design for reuse
For instance, how big should a component be?
We didn't know how to document reuse? Component Data Sheets fell behind
It was hard to decide if guis are reusable. What shouldn't have been reusable?
good subsystems?
We feared we tried to make too much reusable at the higher level
We should've stopped at component, tasking, gui pieces
It's easier to sell 20 pens for $IM than a few with $5M customization
We would need to pay I&T anyway, and should've let it happen
Customers always come in needing new stuff
look at ESU for that model.
Yes, we didn't 'feed the beast'
So, we had no other place to get $ for maintenance
How to make
Interview Subject #5
Position: Software Manager
"We do ok at reusing sw, it's the giving back that we do a poor job at"
creating a repository is hard - easy to find, identify, and reuse
[the grassroots movement within the company called xfg is an] example of smaller scale reuse.
It is a big step forward
The ideal is something like linux - [it's open and reusable, but when you install it, you] expect to
work
The most often [pattern used] is when we take the algorithm out, build around it
We have a hard time b/c we don't feed it back in and make usable by others
Interview Subject #6
Position: Software Architect
"The toughest thing about reuse is maintaining synchronization to a baseline -so
that existing programs can take advantage of changes by future programs"
The best reuse level is components and libraries, it's less about subsystems.
You need to reuse on a module scale to consider it reuse.
Interview Subject #7
Position: Software Engineer
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Communication or lack thereof on a technical level handicaps us
Functional breakdown contributed to communication issues (why re-writing tasking in java?)
Biz model wasn't consistent and realistic. Didn't balance the needs of the program and
needs of a product. We needed more standardization. Treat people as one group. A
Tech steward is the team lead. Too often people are pulled as warm bodies.
We tried to foist cost on programs (merging); need some coordinated internal funding; lay out
common work at planning stage, get it paid for.
Interview Subject #8
Position: Business Area Software Functional Manager
At least Odin was designed for reuse; as opposed to forcing reuse of something not[designed that way] like EW example A
[More often we see] clone and own as opposed to reuse program
If you're gonna do reuse, everyone's gotta be on board with it (SW, SE, HW)
Do we allocate reqts to reuse items?
Which gives a competitive advantage for bidding/executing programs?
Q; Shouldn't every large company have a gforge type repository?
Interview Subject #9
Position: Project Manager
What did they want to reuse? Algorithms, HW isolation
Also discussed: modularity (boundaries, robust interfaces) in a(n iron?) triangle with NRE and
performance.
Now we're reusing components, tasking, and subsystems.
Interview Subject #10
Position: Software Manager
We're not realistic about what we expect to reuse and then actually reusing it
We don't communicate what the expectation is based on the sw bid spreadsheed
CA was a system reuse thing - exercised new paths in the code, of course you're gonna find
bugs.
CE: reused exactly what we planned. Took some particular people to get it right (that had
learned from CA?) and stick to the plan
Yes, the reuse program is a good thing. Stick to the plan. Need better tools for sharing and a
better understanding about what we have (ref Jacobson here)
Interview Subject #11
Position: Software/DSP Architect and Developer
We need a pull model. Each group pulls some good stuff out. We have 'keepers' that maintain
the latest and greatest of the 30 main things. (Interviewer response) there's no guarantee
they'lli all work together.
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We shouldn't try for the full nut: tasking, components, GUI; but rather something more modest -
components of parts thereof.
Interview Subject #12
Position: Enterprise Director of Software Engineering
Developed a mode for cost avoidance... reuse still requires 35% more to integrate and test it.
EW example system A, there was no substantial investment in trying to execute that reuse
strategy. Needs to be unraveled and rewickered as a framework. It's not a SW architecture,
the software is there to make the hardware work.
IC example B is a big success. In 16 countries with 1000's of users. It was productized and
looks forward into the market. Licenses are sold in industry, even within the company. Therein
lies the funding stream. Charge less, build momentum.
A3: Acronym & Definition List
ACTD - Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator - a type of DoD program, early in
the lifecycle.
CPI/SPI - Cost Performance Index, Schedule Performance Index
Component - a software module that plugs into a component-framework architecture.
DoD - US Department of Defense
Framework - a piece of software that manages communications and isolation of
components in a component-framework architecture.
IRaD - Internal Research and Development
NPV - Net Present Value
LOC - Lines of Code
ROI - Return on Investment
RUP - The Rational Unified Process - a process for iterative object-oriented software
development, developed by Rational Corporation.
SDD - System Development and Demonstration - a type of DoD program, mid-way
through the lifecycle.
Thread - a set of components that runs in sequence (a subsystem) to take an input and
create an output. A logical flow of processing that can 'stand alone'.
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